Interrogating available indexes from a discourse-theoretical point of view, this paper utilizes a reformulated populism index in order to identify populist parties. In particular, the index is applied in a candidate survey carried out in Greece in 2015.
Introduction
In this paper we present the findings of research designed to test if and how populist attitudes among political elites can be measured by including a battery of items in a survey questionnaire producing particular indexes. In particular, we purport to enrich the work published in the available populism literature with insights from a predominantly discursive approach inspired by the so-called Essex School. We have thus employed statements conducive to the two criteria of populist identification highlighted by this theoretical orientation; in particular, we explore whether attitudes (a) are constructed around the nodal point 'the people', and (b) reflect a perception/representation of society as divided between two hostile camps: the people against the elite. Our first research question is the following: Can we use this theoretically informed battery and the resulting populism index to discriminate between populist and non-populist parties? A second one follows: Can we use these and additional survey items to discriminate between left-wing and right-wing populism?
In the 2015 Greek Candidate Survey we have thus asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements on a five point Likert scale and we have used their responses to create an index of populist attitudes for each respondent. Then we have summarized these populism indexes by political party in order to create a populism index for each political party. In order to test our research questions/hypotheses, we first register reflexively the existing prevailing wisdom separating Greek political parties into populist and non-populist or anti-populist. Then we compare our survey-based populism indexes with this standpoint. If the index associated with a populist party is significantly stronger than the index pertaining to a non-populist party, then our battery could be seen as a promising way of measuring populism. The findings presented in this paper are based on the Greek part of the Comparative Candidate Survey, which is conducted as a web survey. Unfortunately, the dataset does not offer the opportunity for a comparative analysis between countries, but it can serve as a useful pilot study to check the quality of the statements used in the populism battery.
The results produced by the Candidate Survey provide crucial information regarding the supply side of populist attitudes in the Greek context, since candidates actively construct and/or transmit appeals to the electorate, (re)producing interpellations in a more or less coherent manner, depending on the political party they represent. Measuring candidates' populist attitudes has not been attempted in the existing bibliography -which has focused on measuring party populism (Hawkins 2010; Pauwels 2011; Rooduijn et al 2014; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011) and citizens' populist attitudes (Hawkins et al 2012; Akkerman et al 2013; Spruyt et al 2016) .
Doing so could provide valuable insights into what may be not just an additional
aspect, but the missing link connecting the two aforementioned dimensions, translating and 'embodying' party ideology in accessible ways able to potentially influence citizens' attitudes and vice-versa.
STATE OF THE ART: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE POPULIST ATTITUDES BATTERY
The first version of our survey items used to measure populist attitudes have been developed by Kirk Hawkins and Scott Riding (2010) . Following their argument that populism is not an ideology, but a worldview that 'identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite' they have tried to develop questions that incorporate both the core ideas of populism and the language in which they are Building on the aforementioned studies, Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2013) have tested a battery of items to measure populist attitudes and to investigate whether these attitudes can be linked with party preferences on a representative data set of 586 Dutch respondents. This battery consists of three types of questions with a target to measure (a) populist attitudes, (b) pluralist attitudes, and (c) elitist attitudes.
Based on the findings of this paper a group of scholars has proposed six populist attitudes items for the CSES Module 5 (2016 -2021 .
Enter the Essex School: discourse theory and surveys

Populist vs. non-populist profiles
The way we have chosen to formulate our questions attempts to facilitate further an evolving dialogue between the 'new mainstream' in populism studies -comprising the aforementioned work by Mudde, Hawkins, etc. -and a discursive approach based on 'minimal criteria' and inspired by the Essex School (Towshend 2003) . It is true that the theoretical and methodological corpus of the Essex School has not been thus far adequately combined with quantitative measures of analysis. Thus, combining the Essex School conceptual toolkit with quantitative methods, and especially ones that are based on surveys, constitutes a timely priority as well as a considerable challenge.
Obviously, our aim is not some kind of fusion of discourse theory with attitudes measurement, but rather the establishment of a constructive dialogue and exchange between the two traditions and methods. To be sure, methodological distance remains between discursive and survey approaches. There is, for example, a mounting critical bibliography on the use of attitudes in social (especially discursive) psychology that highlights the often ignored variability and instability of attitudes, as well as questioning the very applicability of the term/theory in discursive inquiry (see Schwarz and Bohner 2001; Potter and Wetherell 1987; Potter 1998; Ajzen 2005) .
Thus, from a discursive point of view the 'attitudes' captured and represented here are not regarded as underlying entities that algorithmically predetermine or generate specific behaviours, discursive patterns and public views (see also, in this respect, Potter & Wetherell 1987: 43-55) . They are rather interpreted as discursive units like many others, and thus not as privileged entry points into the real (and/or supposedly stable) identity or the behavioural predispositions of social subjects. In other words, by capturing certain attitudes among candidates at a certain point, we aim to offer an additional yet crucial glimpse of an aspect/element of the broader discursive articulations of populist and nonpopulist parties, which can be assessed side by side, for example, with the official discourse of these parties to be found in party documents and electoral manifestos. In this context, and despite the internal differentiations between attitudes, emerging or non-emerging patterns, convergence or divergence with other findings stemming from discursive or ideological/ideational approaches to populism, the exercise attempted here might tell us something useful about the very nature of populism itself and the best way to research it. Now, the theorists that developed the Essex School approach (see Laclau 1977 Laclau , 1980 Laclau , 2005a Laclau , 2005b Panizza 2005; Stavrakakis 2004; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Katsambekis 2016) have indeed gradually constructed a distinct model of defining populism, one that has recently attracted the attention of mainstream theorists (Hawkins 2010: 10) . This model is based on two minimal discursive criteria. In particular, it maintains that in order to qualify a movement or party as 'populist', the discursive practices associated with the agents under examination should: a) stage a polarized representation of society as divided between two main blocs: i.e. the establishment, the power block versus the underdog (in opposition to consensual and/or technocratic discourses highlighting the continuity of the social fabric). b) involve claims to represent one of the poles implicated in this uneven dualist distribution, the one associated with the excluded/subordinated part, namely 'the people' (in some languages reference is made to a whole series of equivalent signifiers performing this representational operation; in Spanish, for example, the populism of PODEMOS refers to 'la gente' as well as to 'el pueblo', etc.).
According to this line of argument, both indications need to be present for a discourse or a movement to be classified as 'populist': a dichotomic view of the social field and 'the people' as a discursive nodal point. Otherwise no useful differential classification can emerge to the extent that far too many political discourses could be associated with only one of the two without, of course, being populist. Hence, on the one hand, these criteria can produce operational mappings of the political frontiers between populist and non-populist or anti-populist camps in particular contexts -as well as accounting for their occasional sedimentation through the emergence and establishment of a populist/anti-populist cleavage in certain political cultures (Pappas 2014: 58) ; on the other, they also register the vast plurality of different and often conflicting political articulations populist profiles can acquire.
Having registered the communication between the new mainstream and the Essex School, it should be clear that we employ a discursive perspective. Recent scholarship has highlighted the ambiguities, contradictions and impasses of the currently dominant 'ideological' or 'ideational' approach, mainly advocated by Cas Mudde (2007) (Aslanidis 2015) . It is crucial to stress here that even scholars that claim to understand populism along the lines of Mudde's perspective, often avoid ascribing to populism the character of an ideology ('thin' or otherwise). An interesting example here is Stijn van Kessel, who departs from Mudde's remarks in order to offer a definition that stresses the discursive elements of populism (van Kessel 2015: 13), understanding it more as a 'set of ideas ' (Kessel 2015: 11) . In fact, van Kessel highlights right from the first page of his latest book that he aims to 'identify parties that stand out from the others in terms of their consistent expression of a populist discourse' (Kessel 2015: 1) . To sum up, dropping the ideological clause means that we clearly acknowledge the lack of coherence and continuity in terms of values, policies, programmes, etc. between populist parties and movements. It means that we opt to shift the emphasis from content to form; that we choose to focus primarily on their shared logic, on the particular way in which the various discursive elements are organised and articulated in a given discourse. Such a choice is clearly reflected in the way our survey items are formulated. This, however, does not mean that we are throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Despite the shortcomings of the ideological/ideational approach to populism, we acknowledge that there is undisputable merit in the relevant theoretical corpus and empirical research as well some shared premises with discourse analysis. In this sense, our stance is not one of rejection, but rather of creative incorporation (see also Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014: 122) .
Right-wing vs. left-wing populist profiles
A second concern of contemporary discursive approaches (also see Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014) , has to do with the varying contents of populist discourses and the different significations of the 'people' and the 'elite', or 'the people' and its 'other(s)'.
For example, when studying the recent Greek experience one immediately realizes that the content of SYRIZA's discourse, regarding who the 'people' are, could not be furthest from the populist right and extreme-right rhetoric of other parties, which are often described as populist as well. What becomes thus visible is two very different conceptualizations of the 'people' circulating in the Greek public sphere: the first, put forward mainly by SYRIZA, seems to be active, pluralist, inclusive, democratic and emancipatory; the second, characteristic of extreme or extremist right-wing parties, is predominantly nationalist, rather passive, even racially and ethnically pure, antidemocratic and authoritarian (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014: 135) . For example, the Independent Greeks (ANEL), a populist and nationalist right-wing party (currently SYRIZA's government coalition partner), understand the people as the 'Greek people', as a predominantly national people. Moving to the (neo-nazi) extreme-right, one finds Golden Dawn, which also portrays 'the people' as a 'national people'; actually a racially pure and ethnic people, very close to a Greek version of Aryanism.
At the same time, the enemy of the people is most often identified with persecuted minorities (immigrants, refugees, etc.) . In this sense, and although Golden Dawn is sometimes referred to as a populist party (Anastasakis 2013; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2013) , it would be a huge category mistake to designate Golden Dawn, an extremist para-military organization/party with clear Nazi-like characteristics, as predominantly 'populist': any references to the 'people' within its discourse remains peripheral, ultimately reduced to a nativist and racist conception of the nation, which functions as the nodal point of its discursive articulation. Indeed, not only is 'people' reduced to 'nation' or 'race' in Golden Dawn rhetoric; at the same time (popular) representation is replaced by some sort of direct embodiment along the lines of the Hence, we are expecting to see, first, a central position attributed to 'the people' within the discourse/attitudes of parties designated as populist, while assuming that 'the people' would occupy a less significant position in non-populist ones; second, a strong antagonistic conception of society that represents the 'people' and the 'elites' as two rival camps in the first group; and third, a more inclusivist and pluralist conception of 'the people' on the left of the political spectrum, against a rather exclusivist and homogenizing one on the right (examining attitudes towards immigration and specific social groups, like homosexuals, etc., would be crucial here).
Last but not least, affinities between parties regarding inclusivity/exclusivity and thus views on immigration should be more significant with regard to their positioning on the ideologico-political spectrum (Left-Right) and not with regard to their populist or non-populist profile (e.g. ANEL should be closer to ND, and SYRIZA should be closer to PASOK and RIVER).
Data
The Greek Candidate Study is part of the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) which is a joint multi-national project with the goal of collecting data on candidates running for national parliamentary elections in different countries using a common core questionnaire in a post-election candidate survey conducted in each country.
CCS is conducted after the elections in order to collect data at the same period that data on voters are collected as part of national election studies. This means that in order to understand the findings presented in the following sections of this paper, we should take into account that the candidates give their answer when they already know the electoral outcome and whether their political parties are in government or not.
It should be noted that, in theory, the target population of the CCS comprises all the candidates who have participated in the parliamentary election. In practice, when the members of each national research team organize the national candidate survey, they have to take into account the specific characteristics of their country. The target population has thus been limited to the candidates of the larger parties. In addition, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and Golden Dawn (GD) have always and consistently refused to provide a list of email addresses for their candidates. To make things worse, the candidates of these parties are usually selected directly by the party leadership. Most of them do not run personal campaigns, they do not have personal websites and it is arguably impossible to find their personal contact details.
2
At the same time, obtaining a limited number of questionnaires from these parties makes impossible any reliable statistical processing.
3 As a result, the Greek Candidate datasets could not include these parties.
At any rate, the lack of KKE and GD candidates is not anticipated to create substantial problems for our analysis. Firstly, because we never purported to argue that our populism index can examine and classify all 22 parties that participated in the elections. This would be extremely costly and probably useless, mainly because, for most of the smaller Greek parties, it is not known by other methods (such as discourse analysis) and has not been publicly debated whether they should be considered populist or not. Instead, what is really and crucially at stake is whether it is possible to identify and classify as populist (or not) the five parties that are included in the dataset; it is here that one can compare an overall consensus on their populist or nonpopulist profile -in fact, a consensus corroborated by a discursive methodology For the Greek part of the study we have used 6 items that were included in the battery proposed to CSES plus 2 additional items elaborated from a discursive perspective. The only item that had to be changed because it was not suitable for candidates was the question: 'I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician' that was changed to 'People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician'. A statement with this meaning is not expected by a mainstream politician, but there are many examples of populist leaders who have expressed similar ideas, arguing that they should not be seen as politicians (Panizza 2005: 21) . Instead, they claim to be ordinary citizens and when they get in dialogue with the people they follow Berlusconi who used to adopt the phrase: "I am one of you" (Tarchi 2002: 133) . This approach seems to work for Donald Trump as well, who gets endorsements for not being a 'professional' politician, but one of the people.
We have also avoided to include any item that refers to politics as a struggle between 'good' and 'evil'. Whenever a similar item was used in a survey it either has not loaded heavily in the factors (both US studies in Hawkins et al 2012) or it has loaded higher on the elitism dimension (Akkerman et al 2013) . Trying to justify the failure of this item to load on the populism factor, Akkerman et al have argued that the item may have been interpreted more strictly along religious lines and that it may be more suitable for the 'Latin American context, where populist leaders use a more religiously inspired discourse' (ibid., 12). Thus, the items we have used clearly involve a polarized viewpoint of a society that is divided between two main blocs, but the moral dimension, i.e. the opposition of 'good' against 'evil' (which may be as well used by the supporters of the anti-populism camp in order to accuse populist actors) is not included in our items. All in all, in our analysis, one item (the one concerning the moral dimension)
is excluded and two new ones are added, marking in this way a first shift/variation with regard to 'mainstream' approaches. To be sure, we acknowledge that there is much more to be done in the direction of adjusting quantitative research toward a more discourse-oriented perspective in the analysis of the populist phenomenon. This is why we have opted to understand this paper as a 'pilot study.'
The battery of the eight items was thus formulated as follows and they were included as 5-point Likert items using the following coding 1: Strongly disagree, 2:
Disagree, 3: Neither agree nor disagree, 4: Agree, 5: Strongly agree:
POP1. The politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people.
POP2. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.
POP3. The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.
POP4. People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.
POP5. Elected officials talk too much and take too little action. 
Findings
The Greek CCS 2015 was conducted from mid-February to end of July 2015 as a web survey. The population of interest is the group of all candidates running with the five following parties: SYRIZA, ND, RIVER, PASOK, ANEL. Andreadis (2016) estimates the response rate of the Greek CCS 2015 between 35.2% and 37.6%
(depending on how the cases of unknown eligibility are used in the formula). Since the targeted population includes the same number of candidates from each of the five parties, in a representative sample each party should be represented by circa 20%. The distribution of completed questionnaires per party is presented in Table 1 demonstrating that the distribution per party in the sample is similar to the distribution per party in the population.
<< Table 1 around here >> According to Andreadis (2016) : (a) In Table 2 we present the descriptive statistics for the eight populist attitudes items that were included in the Greek CCS 2015. The table shows the number of responses (N) for each variable, its mean value, standard deviation and median. The median is included in the table as a more appropriate measure of central tendency because the variables are ordinal. The mean value for two of the items (POP4 and POP6) is less than 3 (i.e. the middle category of the scale). In fact, the median of POP 6 is 2, indicating that half of the candidates disagree with the idea that compromising is equal to selling out. The highest mean value is observed for item POP8: 'Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-making'.
<< Table 2 around here >>
In the Appendix we test the reliability and unidimensionality of the scale. The reliability is tested with both Cronbach's alpha and ordinal alpha (Gadermann, Guhn and Zumbo, 2012 ). The unidimensionality is tested with factor analysis and Mokken scale analysis (van Schuur, 2003; Germann and Mendez, 2015) using the R package mokken (Van der Ark, 2012). All the tests we have used indicate that excluding POP5
gives a better scale. Thus, we have dropped this item and our populism index is constructed as the mean value of the remaining seven populist attitude items. 5 As Figure 1 indicates, according to the populism index the candidates of PASOK, ND and RIVER -parties generally assumed to be non-populist, something also consistent with our discursive framework -score below 3.5 while the candidates of both SYRIZA and ANEL -parties generally assumed to be populist, something also consistent with our discursive framework -score over 3.5. As their 95% confidence intervals indicate, ANEL candidates score higher than SYRIZA candidates on the populism index. PASOK, ND and RIVER candidates do not differ significantly on the same index and they form a common group. But this group (the candidates of PASOK, ND and RIVER) scores significantly lower on this scale and it is significantly different from the groups of SYRIZA and ANEL candidates.
<< Figure 1 around here >>
Greece is not only one of the few countries with both significant left-wing and rightwing populist parties. In addition, it currently has a coalition government formed by a left-wing and a right-wing populist party. This allows for very interesting comparisons of left-wing and right-wing populist candidates. In order to study if there are differences between the (assumed) left-wing populism of SYRIZA candidates and the (assumed) right-wing populism of ANEL candidates we have run a t-test for each of the items to compare between the candidates of these parties.
As Table 3 Its cadres have not thus developed the type of militancy and institutional culture that the cadres of SYRIZA have built within their party.
<< Table 3 Table 4 shows that there is a chasm separating SYRIZA and ANEL with regard to their attitudes toward issues such as crime and immigration. The scores of SYRIZA and ANEL candidates on the Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) vs TraditionalAuthoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) index are 1.9 and 3.4 respectively, providing additional support to the hypothesis that right-wing populism is exclusionary and identity-focused, while left-wing populism is more inclusionary and pluralist.
For a more detailed presentation of the differences between candidates of leftwing and right-wing populist parties we can refer to << Table 5 around here>>
Conclusion
In this paper we have used candidate responses on a re-formulated battery of populist items creating an index of populist attitudes for each respondent. We have demonstrated that this index can be used to discriminate between populist and nonpopulist parties in contemporary Greece. More specifically, our findings show that the candidates of the parties that have been generally categorized as populist and also qualify as such using discourse analysis (in dialogue with the 'new mainstream' in populism studies), namely SYRIZA and ANEL, score significantly higher than the candidates of the mainstream parties, usually designated as non-populist or antipopulist.
Our second task was to investigate if we can use these and additional survey items to discriminate between left-wing and right-wing populism. Using the candidate data we have found that the candidates of the left-wing populist party SYRIZA are more willing to listen to other opinions and to compromise than the candidates of the right-wing populist party ANEL. Using additional survey items we have concluded that right-wing populism is exclusionary and identity-focused, while left-wing populism is more inclusive and pluralist. Indeed inclusionary and pluralist attitudes are stronger on the left of the political spectrum than on the right, and thus affinities are bigger with regard to positioning on the ideologico-political spectrum (Left-Right)
and not with regard to a populist or non-populist profile (e.g. ANEL appear closer to the mainstream right or centre-right ND, and SYRIZA closer to the centre or centreleft, PASOK and RIVER). The findings in Table 5 identities of the social subjects to which they appeal and vice-versa. However, the distinction we actually have in mind is one consistent with post-Althusserian discourse theory as it differentiates between interpellation, the transmission of a (populist) message/call from above, which simultaneously creates its subjects, and identification, the reception of a (populist) message from below in terms of subjective investment and active self-placement within a discursive structure (Jorgensen & Phillips 2002: 15, 40-1, 43) . Such a distinction may be utilized as a qualification of the classic supply and demand opposition.
Of course, the empirical analysis conducted in this paper is Greece-specific, hence the wider validity of the index we have developed will require its future application in other contexts. In this respect, it is in our immediate plans to proceed with such a research that will shed additional light to the hypotheses and findings presented here. It also remains to be seen whether our method is suitable to research other countries in the European context and beyond; it seems, however, plausible to expect that similar results will be generated in countries facing similar challenges in crisis-ridden Europe and exhibiting a similar political culture. After all, certain items of the questionnaire we have utilised have already been used in other contexts (as has been illustrated in our literature review above).
Regarding further future research, our attempt here is indicative of the merits of adopting a multiple-methods strategy in researching, understanding and 'measuring' populism on the levels of discourse and voters'/candidates' attitudes.
Additional methods that could be adopted here, in order to arrive at an even wider scope of inquiry/justification include computer assisted discourse analysis and indepth analysis of patterns of parliamentary behaviour. Additional subjects of study would, in the first instance, encompass congruence between candidates and voters in the Greek context and beyond. Our discursive methodology provides the concrete basis for a strategy that could simultaneously utilize different research approaches and can serve both as the source for the formulation of questions/hypotheses on each level and as a reflexive tool for the analysis of the respective research outcomes. The scalability (homogeneity) coefficient H for the entire scale is improved from 0.381 (in the model with all eight items) to 0.422 (after excluding POP5). 
